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Abstract
A natural basis for the detection of a wireless random reactive jammer (RRJ) is the perceived
violation by the detector (typically located at the access point (AP)) of the carrier sensing protocol
underpinning many wireless random access protocols (e.g., WiFi). Specifically, when the wireless
medium is perceived by a station to be busy, a carrier sensing compliant station will avoid transmission
while a RRJ station will often initiate transmission. However, hidden terminals (HTs), i.e., activity
detected by the AP but not by the sensing station, complicate the use of carrier sensing as the basis
for RRJ detection since they provide plausible deniability to a station suspected of being an RRJ. The
RRJ has the dual objectives of avoiding detection and effectively disrupting communication, but there
is an inherent performance tradeoff between these two objectives. In this paper we capture the behavior
of both the RRJ and the compliant stations via a parsimonious Markov chain model, and pose the
detection problem using the framework of Markov chain hypothesis testing. Our analysis yields the
receiver operating characteristic (ROC) of the detector, and the optimized behavior of the RRJ. While
there has been extensive work in the literature on jamming detection, our innovation lies in leveraging
carrier sensing as a natural and effective basis for detection.
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This research has been supported by the National Science Foundation under award #CNS-1228847. Preliminary version of this
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I. INTRODUCTION
Jamming attacks are a widely recognized threat to wireless networks. As a type of denial-
of-service attack, wireless jamming leverages the broadcast nature of the wireless medium and
emits jamming signals either to prevent other (compliant) users from accessing the network,
or to corrupt ongoing transmissions. There are three major types of jammers [2]: i) constant
jammer, which constantly sends jamming signals, ii) random jammer, which randomly alternates
between jamming and idle states, and iii) reactive jammer, which emits jamming signals upon
sensing any ongoing traffic over the wireless channel. Compared with the first two types, the
reactive jammer (RJ) is more sophisticated in that it achieves high jamming efficiency by only
disrupting ongoing transmissions, which in general also lowers the risk of detection [2]. A RJ
faces an inherent tradeoff in the dual objectives of effectively degrading network throughput
and in avoiding detection: as the “aggressiveness” of the jamming is increased, it increases the
effectiveness of the disruption, but at the same time increases the ease with which behavior not
compliant with carrier sensing is detected. This detection is often based upon changes in network
performance statistics such as the packet delivery rate (PDR), received signal strength (RSS),
packet delivery delay, etc. However, the presence of hidden terminals (HT), i.e., transmissions
detectable by the access point (AP) but not the sensing station, complicates the jamming detection
problem, as the AP cannot always disambiguate whether a new packet is a (malicious) jamming
decision or a (innocuous) HT mistake [3]. This motivates our work on RJ detection and RJ
design in the presence of HTs. There are several related detection problems: i) deciding whether
or not a specified (suspicious) station is a jammer, which is the focus of this paper, ii) identifying
which station is the jammer given knowledge that there is a jammer in the network, and iii)
deciding whether or not each station in the network is a jammer or a compliant station.
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3A. Related works
The detection of general jamming attacks has been extensively studied in [2]–[11]. Xu et al.
[2] analyze the influence of various jamming attacks on the PDR and RSS of the network, and
propose a thresholding algorithm for jamming detection. Other works such as [8], [9] utilize
different metrics, such as the channel busy ratio, the number of retransmission attempts, etc., in
addition to the metrics proposed by Xu et al., and employ machine learning based techniques
for jamming detection. Shin et al. [4] propose an approach based on group testing to identify
the trigger stations, whose signal triggers the RJ activity, in wireless sensor networks. Lu et al.
[7] investigates jamming attacks in time-critical networks and present analytical results of the
network message invalidation ratio under jamming. There is also a body of work on analyzing
jamming attacks’ effects on the performance of wireless networks [12]–[14]. Bayraktaroglu et
al. [14] present theoretical results of the IEEE 802.11 throughput under various jamming attacks,
and their analysis is mainly built upon Bianchi’s Markov chain model of 802.11 DCF [15].
Although there is a large body of work on jamming attacks, few analytical results have been
developed about the relationship between the effectiveness and the detectability of jamming
attacks, which is the central focus of our work. Li et al. consider mathematical models of
an optimal jamming attack which chooses its jamming probability that balances the tradeoff
between the long-term amount of corrupted packets and the detection time under the slotted
Aloha protocol [5]. The jamming detection algorithm that Li et al. employed is a sequential
probability ratio test based on the amount of collision events. One drawback of Li et al.’s work
is that it only considers the slotted Aloha protocol, which does not incorporate carrier sense
multiple access (CSMA), an essential feature of the ubiquitous IEEE 802.11 protocol.
B. Contributions and outline
This paper focuses on both RJ attack design and the detection of RJ attacks by the AP, in
the presence of HTs. We consider a “single-hop” wireless network in which multiple wireless
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4stations communicate directly with a single AP, equipped with a jamming detection monitor.
Our work is distinct from previous work such as [5] in that our detector leverages the CSMA
mechanism underlying many modern wireless multiple access protocols. Wireless stations are
compliant in the sense that they are assumed to comply with the CSMA mechanism, meaning
that they sense the wireless channel and only transmit if and when the medium is sensed as
idle, while reactive jammers are bad actors that violate the CSMA mechanism, meaning that
they sense the channel and only transmit when the medium is sensed as active. This behavior,
when identified, differentiates the reactive jammers from the compliant stations, and is the basis
for the AP’s ability to detect RJ. The difficulty of this detection, however, is that the AP cannot
disambiguate whether a transmission on top of an active channel is attributable to the (innocuous)
HT or to the (malicious) reactive jammer.
Our contributions include: i) we design a novel algorithm based on a Markov chain model
that detects RJ by its violation of the CSMA mechanism in a network with HT problems, ii)
we analyze the variance of the test statistic of a generic binary hypothesis testing of ergodic
Markov chains, iii) we build a novel intelligent RRJ model with the two competing goals to
evade the jamming detector and to maximize its jamming efficiency, iv) we propose and analyze
the jamming detection model under different assumptions regarding the knowledge of the jammer
and the AP regarding the state of the network.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. §II formulates the basic mathematical model and
sets up the hypothesis test for jamming detector with full observability, proposes an analytical
upper bound on the test statistic’s variance, and proposes the model for a jammer to choose its
best jamming strategy. §III considers the cases when the detector only has limited observability.
§IV shows numerical results, and §V concludes the paper. Table I lists general notation.
II. MARKOV MODEL FOR FULL OBSERVABILITY
One objective of this paper is to propose a tractable model that captures the essence of CSMA
to detect potentially non-compliant stations, such as jammers. §II-A proposes a novel continuous-
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5Symbol Meaning
m number of stations
Tk a bit indicating the idle/active status of the k-th station
S the state space of the full observability model with size (d+ 1)
d the largest index of the state space of the Markov chain (indexing starts from 0)
T a state in S, denoting a subset of nodes in [m] that are active
pI(k, T ) probability that station k senses the channel as idle with the set of active stations being T
pA(1, T ) probability that the RRJ 1 sends jam packets when the set of active stations being T
pJ the RJ probability
pR the random jamming probability
prrj a row vector equals to [pR, pJ ]
λ a single station’s off to on transition rate when probability of channel being sensed as idle is 1
γ a single station’s on to off transition rate
Hb null hypothesis when b = 0, alternative hypthesis when b = 1
Qb transition rate matrix under Hb
qbi,j the transition rate from state i to state j under Hb
Pb transition matrix under hypothesis Hb
pbi,j transition probability from state i to state j under Hb
pib a row vector denoting the stationary distribution of Pb (or Qb)
pibj the j-th element of pi
b
W length of the sample path
Ni,j the number of transitions from state i to state j
Zb the log-likelihood ratio test statistic random variable (8) under Hb
η jamming efficiency metric (15)
TABLE I: Notation.
time Markov chain (CTMC) model for the overall transmission behavior of a network consisting
of CSMA-compliant stations, and also proposes a more advanced jammer called a random
reactive jammer (RRJ). §II-B introduces the general supervised hypothesis testing problem of
Markov chain models. §II-C presents an approach for selecting the best jamming strategy for an
intelligent RRJ. §II-D introduces the semi-supervised testing problem for when only the behavior
of compliant stations are available to the detector for training.
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6A. Mathematical models
There have been extensively works on modeling the CSMA protocols in the literature: one
group of works concentrates on using an idealized CTMC model for CSMA/CA WiFi networks
and approximating their throughput [16]–[22]; while [23], [24] focus on using CTMC to model
the interaction between the APs of multiple networks to analyze their performance. The proposed
CTMC in our paper is distinct from previous works in that: i) our model is more realistic in
that it is built on the physical interference model of the channel, while previous works employ
a simple contention-graph based flow model that assumes WiFi signal sensing is deterministic
and does not take the randomness of interference into consideration; ii) the objectives of our
work are distinct from previous works in that our work aims to use the CTMC model to infer
channel statistics, such as the fraction of certain station’s transmitting time, and also to detect
jammers using the state transition statistics.
This section assumes the network monitor, assumed to be located at the AP, is “omniscient”
in the sense that it is aware of the transmission behavior of all stations in the network, which
consists of m stations and the AP. For simplicity, we also assume the stations are immobile and
all stations have the same transmission power pt. We assume all stations are backlogged, i.e.,
each station always has a packet awaiting transmission, and as such the status of a single station
k ∈ [m] may be represented by a bit: Tk = 0 or 1 indicates station k is idle or active. The
overall transmission behavior of the whole network is modeled by a CTMC with state space S,
with cardinality |S| = d + 1 ≡ 2m, and each state T representing a distinct subset of [m]. The
state of the system is the subset of active stations, i.e., T = {k ∈ [m] : Tk = 1}. We define
several network parameters: the received power po at a reference distance do, the Rayleigh fading
random variable of the k-th station Fk ∼ Exp(1), the pathloss exponent α, the location vector of
all the stations in [m], denoted x = [x1, x2, ..., xm], and the minimum received power required
for a station to detection transmission is θ. The service rate is denoted by γ, the sensing rate is
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7λ, and pI(k, T ) denotes the probability the channel is sensed as idle at station k when the set
of current active stations is T :
pI(k, T ) ≡ P
(∑
k′∈T
Fk′l(‖xk′ − xk‖) +N0 ≤ θ
)
. (1)
Here, ‖xk′ − xk‖ denotes the Euclidean distance between stations k′ and k, N0 denotes the
background noise power, and l(d) (with l(d) = pod−α if d ≥ do, and l(d) = pt, if d < do) is the
large-scale pathloss model. As such, (1) gives the probability that station k senses the medium
to be idle (as the received power level is below the minimum power level threshold θ required
for detection of activity) when the set of concurrent transmitters is T . Under the assumption
that the network topology is static, the idle probability pI(k, T ) defined in (1) is the cumulative
distribution function (CDF) of a weighted sum of independent exponential random variables
with weights l(‖xk′ − xk‖). Considering the possibility that some stations have equal distance
to station k, we partition every active station set T to s(T ) ≥ 1 disjoint groups: τ1, ..., τs(T ),
each of which contains stations with equal distance to k: τa ≡ {k′ ∈ T : l(‖xk′ − xk‖) = da}
for a ∈ {1, ..., s(T )}. Then the interference in (1) can be expressed as:∑
k′∈T
Fk′l(‖xk′ − xk‖) =
s(T )∑
a=1
da
∑
k′∈τa
Fk′ . (2)
Applying Amari and Misra’s derivation of the general CDF of summation of independent
exponential random variables in [25], and combining (2), we may compute (1) as:
P
s(T )∑
a=1
da
∑
k′∈τa
Fk′
 ≤ θ′
=1−
s(T )∏
a=1
d−|τa|a
 s(T )∑
l=1
|τl|∑
j=1
exp(−d−1l θ′)θ′|τl|−jΨl,j(−d−1l )
(|τl| − j)!(j − 1)! , (3)
where θ′ = θ−N0, and Ψl,j(d) = − ∂j−1∂dj−1{
∏s(T )
a=0,a6=l(d
−1
a + d)
−|τa|} (note that at the special point
with a = 0, let (d−10 + d)
−|τ0| = d−1). These probabilities are used in the CTMC transition rates,
described below. We begin below with three variants on a simple m = 2 station network, then
generalize in §II-A2 to a network with an arbitrary number m of stations.
1) CTMC for m = 2 stations
Two compliant stations. A compliant station does not transmit if it senses the channel is idle,
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Fig. 1: CTMC of compliant
stations m = 2).
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Fig. 2: CTMC with one naive
RJ (m = 2, kJ = 1).
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γ
Fig. 3: CTMC with one RRJ
(m = 2, kJ = 1).
but will transmit (as it is assumed backlogged) if it senses the channel is busy. Therefore, the
transition rate of station k from idle to active is λpI(k, T ), where recall λ is the sensing rate,
as shown in Fig. 1. The HT phenomenon in the network can be clearly captured by the idle
probability: if T contains only stations that are HTs relative to station k, then the idle probability
pI(k, T ) is relatively high, and the transition rate into the HT state T ∪{k} is thus high as well.
One compliant station and one naive RJ. The behavioral difference between a compliant
station, potentially a HT, and a naive RJ is that a HT will transmit regardless of its HT
counterparts (since HT pairs cannot hear each other’s signal), while a naive RJ only transmits
with a certain jamming probability as soon as it senses signals from other compliant stations
on the channel. Define the jamming probability as pJ . The probability that a naive RJ kJ can
sense the current signal over the channel is pI(kJ , T ), and thus the transition rate of naive RJ
from idle to active is: λpJ(1−pI(kJ , T )). The interactions between stations in a network with a
naive RJ is shown in Fig. 2. As shown, the transition rate from state φ (i.e., there are no active
stations) to state {kJ} (i.e., jammer kJ starts transmitting) is zero, since the naive RJ is only
“triggered” by an active channel. The state transition graphs in Fig. 2 and Fig. 1 are different,
and in this case the Neyman-Pearson test of differentiating these two CTMCs is degenerate to
a singular detection problem [26], meaning that the test can achieve arbitrarily small error [27].
One compliant station and one RRJ. To avoid the singular detection problem, we propose the
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9RRJ model, which equips the RJ with additional randomness. Fig. 3 shows the CTMC for a
network containing a RRJ. The RRJ can better disguise its malicious behavior by mimicking HT:
namely, when there is no traffic over the channel, the RRJ remains idle or randomly transmits
packets with probability pR, and when there are compliant packets transmitting, the RRJ decides
whether or not to jam the compliant packet with certain jamming probability pJ . The proposed
RRJ model increases the detection difficulty since the incorporation of random jamming behavior
makes the RRJ similar to a HT. Thus we can define the anomalous probability of the RRJ kJ
as the probability that the RRJ sends jam packets when the set of active stations is T
pA(kJ , T ) ≡ pRpI(kJ , T ) + pJ(1− pI(kJ , T )). (4)
The RRJ has (pR, pJ) as design parameters. The transition rate of a RRJ from idle to active is
qT ,T ∪{kJ} = λpA(kJ , T ). (5)
2) CTMC for an arbitrary number of stations
We now extend the CTMC to an arbitrary number of stations m. Without loss of generality,
index the station under test (SUT), i.e., the station which the AP is assessing, as the first station
(i.e., kJ = 1), and use indices {2, . . . ,m} to denote the other stations, assumed to be CSMA-
compliant (hereafter referred to as compliant stations (CS)). Fig. 4 shows the state transition
diagram of the CTMC for a network without a RRJ (SUT is CS), while Fig. 5 shows the same
with a RRJ (SUT is RRJ). From (5), the RRJ has two design parameters, (pJ , pR), with pJ
controlling its “reactive jamming” behavior, and pR controlling its “random jamming” behavior.
Define Qb ∈ R(d+1)×(d+1) for b ∈ {0, 1}, where Q0,Q1 are the transition rate matrices for
CTMCs without and with the RRJ, respectively, and qbi,j is the (i, j)-th element of Q
b, denoting
the transition rate from state i to state j in S. Note that for notation simplifity, we use i (or
j) to interchangeably denote: i) a specific state i in S; ii) the specific index of state i in S
according to certain ordering of states in S, in the rest of this paper. From Fig. 4, if i = T and
j = T ∪ {k}, then q0i,j = λpI(k, T ) and q0j,i = γ. From Fig. 5, we have q1i,j = λpI(k, T ) (if
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k 6= 1), q1i,j = λpA(1, T ), and q1j,i = γ.
T
T ∪ {k},
∀k ∈ [m]\T
λpI(k, T )
γ
Fig. 4: CTMC without reactive jammers
(m > 1).
T
T ∪ {k},
∀k ∈ [m]\(T ∪ {1})
T ∪ {1},
if 1 /∈ T
λpI(k, T )
λpA(1, T )
γ
γ
Fig. 5: CTMC with a RRJ (m > 1).
B. Supervised hypothesis testing of Markov chain models
Since the interaction between stations is modeled by Markov chains, we pose the jamming
detection problem as a binary hypothesis testing problem, namely, to identify which of two
Markov chains is more likely to have produced the sequence of observed states. This section
introduces the general problem of binary hypothesis testing of Markov chains, while §II-B1
presents the setup of the hypothesis testing problem, and the theoretical distribution of the test
statistic. Then, §II-B2 develops an analytical upper bound on the variance of the test statistic.
1) The hypothesis test statistic
To facilitate analyzing the hypothesis testing problem, we transform the CTMC models pro-
posed in §II-A to discrete-time Markov chains (DTMCs) through uniformization. Choose an
uniformization parameter u obeying u ≥ max
i,j,b
|qbi,j|. Following the standard procedure, we obtain
a DTMC with transition matrix Pb = Id+1 + Q
b
u
, where Id+1 denotes the d + 1-dimensional
identity matrix. We suppose the network monitor at the AP collects the transmission patterns of
all stations in the network over a time interval of length W
u
, consisting of W intervals each of
length 1/u. Each observation is sampled from the continuous-time stochastic process generated
by a Markov chain in each time interval. To test whether or not the SUT 1 is a RRJ, we
collect a sequence of observations of all stations’ transmission on-off processes, and form the
observation sequence of yW ≡ {Y (t)}W+1t=1 , called a sample path of the DTMC, generated by
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a network containing a RRJ or containing only compliant stations. Under the assumption that
the transition probability matrices P0 of compliant DTMC and P1 of RRJ DTMC are known, a
binary hypothesis testing problem can be formed:
H0 : P = P
0, H1 : P = P
1. (6)
This formulation requires supervised training, i.e., the detector uses both normal and attack
samples for training. The monitor may use observations of the transmission patterns of the
network both with and without RRJs to estimate the transition probabilities.
We now derive the likelihood of yW under H0 and H1. Define i) the state transition counts
as the number of yW ’s transitions from state i to j, denoted Ni,j ≡
∑W
t=1 1{yt=i,yt+1=j}, where
yt indicates the t-th element of vector yW , and ii) the state occupancy counts, denoted Ni ≡∑d
j=0 Ni,j =
∑W
t=1 1{yt=i}. The log-likelihood of yW under hypothesis Hb is: ln f(yW |Hb) =
lnpiby1
∏W
t=1 p
b
yt,yt+1
= lnpiby1 +
∑d
i=0
∑d
j=0Ni,j ln p
b
i,j , with pi
b
y1
denotes the stationary distribution
of state y1 of the DTMC under Hb, and pbi,j is the transition probability from state i to state j.
Thus, the log-likelihood ratio (LLR) between H1 and H0 is [26]: ln
f(yW |H1)
f(yW |H0) , and the LLR test
is:
ln
pi1y1
pi0y1
+
d∑
i=0
d∑
j=0
Ni,j ln
(
p1i,j
p0i,j
) H1
R
H0
ξ(W ),
d∑
i=0
d∑
j=0
Ni,j
W
ln
(
p1i,j
p0i,j
) H1
R
H0
ξ′ ≡
ξ(W )− ln pi1y1
pi0y1
W
.
(7)
Note that the threshold ξ(W ) varies with the observation window length W to balance the
tradeoff between the false alarm rate and the missed detection rate. The most natural choice is
ξ(W ) = ξ0W for which ξ′ ≈ ξ0 for W large. That is, as evident from (7), the initial distribution
has an influence on the detection threshold that decreases to 0 in W as 1/W , and as such has
little impact on the test outcome for large W . The test statistics of the above LLR test is
Z ≡
d∑
i=0
d∑
j=0
li,j
Ni,j
W
, (8)
with parameters li,j ≡ ln
(
p1i,j
p0i,j
)
. To derive the distribution of Z under Hb requires the distributions
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of Ni,j . As is well-known [28], the Ni,j have an asymptotic (in W ) normal distribution. As a linear
combination of Ni,j , the test statistic Z is therefore also asymptotically normal. We henceforth
use the superscript b ∈ {0, 1} to indicate a certain random variable under hypothesis Hb. The
expectation of Nbi,j is E[Nbi,j] = Wpibi pbi,j , and the variance of Nbi,j may be written as (c.f. [29])
Var[Nbi,j] = W (pi
b
i p
b
i,j − pibi 2pbi,j2) + 2pibi pbi,j2
W−1∑
t′=1
(W − t′)bj,i(t
′−1). (9)
Here, [P]i,j denotes the (i, j)-th entry of a matrix P, Pb
(t′−1) is the (t′−1)-step transition matrix
under Hb, and bj,i
(t′−1) ≡ [Pb(t′−1)]j,i − pibi [30]. As W ↑ ∞, transition counts Ni,j , Ni′,j′ are
asymptotically independent for i 6= i′, and thus we assume that Cov[Ni,j, Ni′,j′ ] = 0 for i 6= i′.
We have derived the covariance of Ni,j between Ni′,j′ when i = i′, j 6= j′ as
Cov[Nbi,j, N
b
i′,j′ ] = pi
b
i p
b
i,jp
b
i,j′
(
−Wpibi +
W−1∑
t′=1
(W − t′)
(
bj,i
(t′−1)
+ bj′,i
(t′−1)))
, (10)
but the derivation of (10) is omitted due to space. Based on the above properties of Ni,j , the
distribution of Zb under Hb is asymptotically normal with mean µbZ ≡
∑
i,j li,jpi
b
i p
b
i,j . Defining
Zbi =
∑d
j=0 li,j
Nbi,j
W
, the variance of Zb is derived as follows:
Var[Zb] =
d∑
i=0
Var[Zbi ] +
∑
i 6=j
Cov[Zbi , Z
b
j ]
(a)≈
d∑
i=0
Var[Zbi ] =
∑
i
(∑
j
l2i,j
Var[Nbi,j]
W 2
+ 2
∑
j<j′
li,jli,j′
Cov[Nbi,j, N
b
i,j′ ]
W 2
)
=
∑
i,j
l2i,jpi
b
i p
b
i,j
(
1− pibi pbi,j
W
+ 2pbi,j
W−1∑
t′=1
W − t′
W 2
bj,i
(t′−1)
)
+
2
∑
i,j<j′
li,jli,j′pi
b
i p
b
i,jp
b
i,j′
(
−pi
b
i
W
+
W−1∑
t′=1
W − t′
W 2
(
bj,i
(t′−1)
+ bj′,i
(t′−1)))
,
(11)
Note the approximation (a) holds for large W by the asymptotic independence of Ni,j’s.
2) Analytical upper bound on the variance of the test statistic
The previous section showed that test statistic Z is asymptotically normal as W ↑ ∞, and
we used this to derive the asymptotic mean and variance of Z under the null and alternative
hypotheses. However, the expression of Var[Zb] are unwieldy and difficult to compute as they
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includes a summation over the t-step transition matrices, which are t-th powers of the (one-step)
transition matrix. In this section we develop a simpler, and more easily computable, upper bound
on the variance of Z. As Z is a linear combination of the transition counts, it is useful to first
derive an upper bound on the variances and covariances of Ni,j
W
. Xue et al. proposed spectral
and graphical bounds for the error covariance measure of the classic steady-state distribution
estimator of DTMCs in [31]. However, they did not analyze the variances and covariances of
the transition counts and the variance of the test statistic, which is the focus of our work.
Lemma 1. For an ergodic DTMC with simple eigenvalues, the variance of N
b
i,j
W
has upper bound:
Var
[
Nbi,j
W
]
≤ pibi pbi,j
(
(1− pibi pbi,j)
W
+ 2pbi,jcj,i
2 +W |1− λb1|
W 2|1− λb1|2
)
. (12)
Here, cj,i ≡
∑d
r=1 |ujrvri| is a constant that depends upon the right eigenvector matrix U ∈
R(d+1)×(d+1) of Pb, ujr denotes the (j, r)-th entry of the U, vri denotes the (r, i)-th entry of
U−1, and λb1 represents the largest non-unit eigenvalue of the transition matrix P
b, in the sense
that |1 − λb1| ≤ |1 − λbr | where λbr denotes all the other non-unit eigenvalues of Pb. Similarly,
the covariance of Ni,j and Ni,j′ (j 6= j′) has upper bound:
Cov
[
Nbi,j
W
,
Nbi,j′
W
]
≤ pibi pbi,jpbi,j′
(
−pi
b
i
W
+ (cj,i + cj′,i)
2 +W |1− λb1|
W 2|1− λb1|2
)
. (13)
The proof is shown in §A.
Proposition 1. When P0, P1 are ergodic and have simple eigenvalues, Var[Zb] has upper bound:
Var[Zb] ≤
∑
i,j
l2i,jpi
b
i p
b
i,j
(
1− pibi pbi,j
W
+ 2pbi,jcj,i
2 +W |1− λb1|
W 2|1− λb1|2
)
+ 2
∑
i,j<j′
max {0, li,jli,j′}pibi pbi,jpbi,j′
(−pibi
W
+ (cj,i + cj′,i)
2 +W |1− λb1|
W 2|1− λb1|2
)
.
(14)
Proof: The result follows immediately by applying Lemma. 1 to (11).
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We can see that limW→∞Var[Zb] = 0 with convergence rate O(1/W ). The upper bound in
(14) is a complicated function of the eigenvectors and the largest non-unit eigenvalue of Pb.
C. Strategies for the RRJ under full observability
While the previous subsection proposes a jamming detector based upon a Markov model of the
carrier sensing mechanism of a network, this section studies how an intelligent RRJ should choose
the best operating point. As an attacker, the RRJ naturally has two objectives: i) maximizing its
jamming efficiency, and ii) minimizing the probability of being detected. With this objective in
mind, §II-C1 proposes two performance metrics of an RRJ, §II-C2 develops a large deviations
principle (LDP) approximation for the detection probability, and §II-C3 formulates the RRJ’s
optimization problem based on the LDP.
1) Performance metrics of RRJ
Two performance metrics are proposed with regard to the RRJ’s two objectives: i) the fraction
of collision time caused by the SUT; ii) the detector’s error probability. Define a “collision state”
as a state with multiple transmitters. In this case, the probability of a SUT being in a collision
state is: rb =
∑
i∈S3 pi
b
i = pi
bt, where S3 ≡ {T ∈ S, 1 ∈ T , |T | > 1} denotes the set of collision
states of the Markov chain involving the SUT, and vector t ∈ R2m×1 has components ti = 1 if
i ∈ S3 and ti = 0 otherwise. The jamming efficiency metric is defined as:
η ≡ r1/r0. (15)
The second performance metric is defined either as the missed-detection rate (MDR) or as
the equal error rate (EER), depending upon the context. Given a threshold ξ′, the MDR is
pII(ξ
′) ≡ P[Z1 ≤ ξ′], and the FAR is pI(ξ′) ≡ P[Z0 > ξ′]. The EER is defined as pI(ξ∗)+pII(ξ∗)2
where ξ∗ is the specific detection threshold at which the MDR is equal to the FAR1
Define the column vector prrj = [pR, pJ ] ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] as holding the two design parameters
(pR, pJ). We assume the RRJ is aware of the design of the jamming detector, and as such its
1Or has the minimum distance to the FAR if equality cannot be obtained; this scenario explains the EER definition.
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objective is to maximize the detection error (which may be captured by the MDR), under the
constraint that its jamming efficiency, η, is above certain efficiency threshold, denoted τη. To
emphasis the fact that the transition probability matrix of the DTMC with a RRJ and its cor-
responding stationary distribution are parameterized by the jamming probabilities, hereafter we
denote the transition matrix and its stationary distribution as P1(prrj) and pi1(prrj) respectively.
Thus, the RRJ has the following optimization problem:
maximize
prrj∈[0,1]×[0,1]
pII(ξ
′
α) subject to pi
1(prrj)t ≥ τηpi0t. (16)
Here, i) fZ|H1(z) denotes the Gaussian PDF N (µ1Z ,Var[Z1]), ii) threshold ξ′α ≡ Φ−1(1 −
α)
√
Var[Z0] + µ0Z (with Φ
−1 the inverse CDF of the standard Gaussian distribution), and thus
iii) the detection objective may be written as pII(ξ′α) =
∫ ξ′α
−∞ fZ|H1(z)dz.
In computing pII(ξ′α) in the objective function, we have shown that deriving the exact dis-
tribution of Zb involves calculating powers of the transition matrix. To simplify computation,
one option is to use the upper bound derived in §II-B2 to approximate Var[Zb]. In this case,
we first analyze the effect of applying the upper bound of Var[Zb] to the MDR computation.
Define the upper bound of Var[Zb] shown in (14) as σˆbZ
2 for b = 0, 1, and define a random
variable Zˆb ∼ N (µbZ , σˆbZ2) with PDF fZˆb(z). Then we have ξˆ′α ≡ Φ−1(1−α)σˆ0Z +µ0Z ≥ ξ′α, and
thus,
∫ ξ′α
−∞ fZ1(z)dz ≤
∫ ξˆ′α
−∞ fZ1(z)dz ≤
∫ ξˆ′α
−∞ fZˆ1(z)dz. Hence the usage of σˆ
b
Z will significantly
inflate the MDR in the objective function (16) if the upper bound in (14) is not tight enough.
Furthermore, the (approximated) MDR in the objective, pII(ξ′α) (i.e.,
∫ ξˆ′α
−∞ fZˆ1(z)dz), cannot be
expressed as a explicit function of the RRJ design parameters. Thus, it is infeasible to directly
solve the optimization problem in (16) and obtain an explicit optimal jamming strategy (p∗R, p
∗
J).
As such, we consider an alternative objective function based upon large deviations theory.
2) Large deviations principle (LDP) for the asymptotic missed detection rate (MDR)
The Ga¨rtner-Ellis theorem generalizes Crame´r’s theorem, which gives the decay rate of the
probability that the empirical mean of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random
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variables deviates from the expectation, to the non-i.i.d. case [32]. It has been shown in [26] that
the moment generating function (MGF) of Z0 converges to Λ(t) ≡ lnλmax(t) where λmax(t) is the
eigenvalue with the largest magnitude of the matrix P(t), whose (i, j)-th entry is p1i,j
(t)p0i,j
(1−t).
Similarly, the MGF of Z1 is Λ(t + 1) = lnλmax(t + 1) [26]. The Fenchel-Legendre transform
of Λ(t) is: Λ∗(ξ) ≡ supt∈R(ξt−Λ(t)) = supt∈R(ξt− lnλmax(t)). According to the Ga¨rtner-Ellis
theorem, the decaying rate of the FAR and MDR for detection threshold ξ′ ∈ (µ0Z , µ1Z) are [26]:
lim
W→∞
ln pI(ξ
′)
W
= −Λ∗(ξ′), and lim
W→∞
1
W
ln pII(ξ
′) = ξ′−Λ∗(ξ′). Therefore, the FAR and MDR can
be represented by pI(ξ′) = cI(W )e−WΛ
∗(ξ′), and pII(ξ′) = cII(W )e−W (Λ
∗(ξ′)−ξ′), with constants
lim
W→∞
ln cI(W ) = 0, and similarly for cII(W ). Furthermore, the following lemma derives the
convergence rate of the infimum MDR corresponding to a bounded FAR.
Lemma 2 (Stein’s Lemma [32]). Let 0 < α < 1 denote a FAR threshold, and let pαII ≡
infξ∈{ξ′:pI(ξ′)<α} pII(ξ) denote the corresponding minimum MDR. Then the asymptotic (in W )
minimum MDR corresponding to FAR α is given by the LDP lim
W→∞
1
W
ln pαII = −I(P0,P1(prrj)),
with rate function I(P0,P1(prrj)) ≡
∑
i,j pi
0
i p
0
i,j ln
p0i,j
p1i,j
.
According to Lemma. 2, the infimum MDR for a test that guarantees the pI(ξ′) ≤ α can be
expressed as pαII = cII(W )e
−I(P0,P1(prrj))W . Since limW→∞ ln cII(W ) = 0, we can ignore cII(W )
by assuming that cII(W ) = 1. The following Lemma and proposition show that the function
I(P0,P1(pR, pJ)) is a convex function of the RRJ design parameters pR, pJ .
Lemma 3. The rate function I(P0,P1(prrj)) for the asymptotic (in W ) minimum MDR of an
RRJ is a convex function of pR and pJ .
The proof is in §B. Observe I(P0,P1(prrj)) obtains its unique minimum of zero at pR =
1, pJ = 0, where the RRJ behaves exactly the same as a CS-compliant station.
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3) Asymptotic (in W ) optimal choice of RRJ design parameters (pR, pJ)
We consider the RRJ’s objective of finding the (asymptotic in W ) optimal (p∗R, p
∗
J), i.e., to
minimize the rate function (which maximizes the MDP) subject to the efficiency constraint:
minimize
prrj∈[0,1]×[0,1]
I(P0,P1(prrj)) subject to pi1(prrj)t ≥ τηpi0t. (17)
There are two potential issues with the constraint in the minimization problem above: i) to the
best of our knowledge, the leading eigenvector of the transition matrix, pi1(prrj) generally does
not have an explicit expression when the dimension of P1(prrj) is high; and ii) the efficiency
constraint produces a non-convex feasible set. To address both these issues, we approximate
pi1(prrj) via Taylor series expansion. This expansion both approximates the stationary distribution
as a function of prrj, and also converts the non-convex set to a convex feasible set (at least for
the first-order expansion). The order-k (for k ∈ {1, 2}) Taylor series expansion of pi1 around
the point pˆrrj = [pˆR, pˆJ ] ∈ (0, 1]2 is
pi1ts(prrj, k) = pi
1(pˆrrj)+(prrj−pˆrrj)
(
Jpi1(pˆrrj) +
1{k=2}
2
Hpi1(pˆrrj)[Id+1 ⊗ (prrj − pˆrrj)ᵀ]
)
(18)
with Jacobian Jpi1(prrj) ∈ R2, and Hessian Hpi1(prrj) ∈ R2×2 (⊗ denotes the Kronecker product).
The k-th order partial derivative of pi1(prrj) w.r.t. pR is
∂kpi1(prrj)
∂pkR
= k!(−1)kpi1(prrj)
(
∂Q1(prrj)
∂pR
G(prrj)
)k
,
in which G(prrj) denotes the group inverse matrix of Q1(prrj) and
∂Q1(prrj)
∂pR
denotes the first order
partial derivative w.r.t. pR [33]. The same result applies for the k-th order derivative w.r.t. pJ .
The mixed second-order derivative is [33]:
∂2pi1(prrj)
∂pR∂pJ
= pi1(prrj)
(
∂Q1(prrj)
∂pR
G(prrj)
∂Q1(prrj)
∂pJ
G(prrj) +
∂Q1(prrj)
∂pJ
G(prrj)
∂Q1(prrj)
∂pR
G(prrj)
)
.
(19)
For k ∈ {1, 2}, the approximate optimization problem becomes:
minimize
prrj∈[0,1]×[0,1]
I(P0,P1(prrj)) subject to pi1ts(prrj, k)t ≥ τηpi0t. (20)
Theorem 1. The optimization problem (20) is a convex optimization problem when k = 1.
Proof: According to Lemma. 3, the objective function in (20) is a convex function of prrj.
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Also when k = 1, pi1ts is the first-order Taylor series expansion to pi
1 at point pˆrrj. Therefore
the inequality constraint is linear and also convex in prrj.
D. Semi-supervised hypothesis testing of Markov chain models
The hypothesis testing problem proposed in §II-B1 will not be applicable if the RRJ is not
available for training. An alternative test that requires only the knowledge of transition matrix
corresponding to the network without an RRJ, termed semi-supervised testing, is of natural
interest. Intuitively, it is desired that the detector report an anomaly upon noticing a deviation in
the transmission pattern from P0. To derive such a detector, we cast the problem as a goodness-
of-fit test: H0 : P = P0 vs. H1 : P 6= P0. The log-likelihood of observing a sample path yW
with transition counts {Ni,j} is ln f(yW ) = ln pi0y1 +
∑
i,j Ni,j ln p
0
i,j . The goodness-of-fit test
between H0 and H1 is ∑
i,j
Ni,j
W
ln p0i,j
H0
R
H1
ξ(W )− lnpi0y1
W
, (21)
and the test statistic is Z =
∑
i,j
Ni,j
W
ln p0i,j . The only difference between the semi-supervised
test statistic (21) and the supervised test statistic (8) is that the LLR coefficients li,j’s in the latter
are replaced by the coefficients ln p0i,j’s in the former. Therefore, following the same approach
employed in §II-B, it is straightforward to derive the mean and variance of the test statistic under
Hb. In particular, E[Zb] =
∑
i,j pi
b
i p
b
i,j ln p
0
i,j , and
Var[Zb] =
∑
i,j
(ln p0i,j)
2pibi p
b
i,j
(
1− pibi pbi,j
W
+ 2pbi,j
W∑
t′=1
W − t′
W 2
bj,i
(t′−1)
)
+
2
∑
i,j<j′
(ln p0i,j ln p
0
i,j′)pi
b
i p
b
i,jp
b
i,j′
(
−pi
b
i
W
+
W − t′
W 2
(
bj,i
(t′−1)
+ bj′,i
(t′−1)))
.
(22)
In addition, the analytical upper bound on the test statistic proposed in Proposition. 1 is applicable
to the semi-supervised approach’s test statistic if we replace the li,j’s in (14) by ln p0i,j’s.
We next develop new models in §III, but in §IV we will i) evaluate the accuracy of the
test statistic variance upper bound from §II-B2, ii) evaluate the accuracy of the Taylor series
approximation to the intelligent RRJ strategy optimization problem from §II-C3, and iii) compare
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the detection accuracy of the supervised and semi-supervised hypothesis tests from §II-D.
III. MARKOV MODELS FOR LIMITED OBSERVABILITY
The “full-observability” assumed in §II, i.e., knowledge of which stations are transmitting at
any time, requires that AP and RRJ have the strong capability to differentiate all m of the signals
emitted from the stations. Such an assumption is not feasible in practice. As such, this section
makes the weaker assumption that the AP and RRJ only have limited observability. They don’t
know which stations are currently transmitting, but instead they only know partial information,
such as, i) the number of stations currently transmitting (the “intermediate” model, §III-A), or
ii) whether or not any stations are currently transmitting (the “simplified” model, §III-B).
A. Intermediate model: knowledge of the number of transmitters
To compute the test statistic Zb in §II, the AP must know network parameters λ, γ and the
station location vector x in order to compute the log-likelihood coefficients li,j . It must also
know the transmission status (active or idle) of each station, at every instant in time, in order
to compute the transition counts Ni,j’s of the full sample path. This is a strong assumption
about the capability of the AP which may not hold in practice. This subsection considers an
“intermediate” model in which the AP only holds two pieces of information: i) the number of
stations currently transmitting over the channel, C ≡ |T | (recall T denotes the set of currently
active stations); and ii) whether or not the SUT (station 1) is transmitting, X ≡ 1{1∈T }. The
state in this model is represented by these two numbers: (C,X), which we assume the AP is
able to observe. The state is a stochastic process with a (largely reduced) state space of size 2m.
1) State aggregation
The intermediate model partitions the states of the full observability model, S, into the several
disjoint subsets. With Yˆ ≡ (C,X) denoting a state in the intermediate model, the subset of states
in S corresponding to Yˆ is denoted SYˆ , and consists of all states T from S in which |T | = C
and 1{1∈T } = X . This partition of the state space is called the intermediate partition. Fig. 6
shows the state space and transitions of the intermediate model with m = 3 stations.
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The resulting aggregated stochastic process is denoted {Yˆ (t) : t ≥ 0}, taking value in
the aggregated state space Sˆ = {(0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 1), ..., (m, 1)}. Although the process Y (t) is
Markov, the aggregated process Yˆ (t) may not be Markov. A common term for (Markov chain)
state aggregation is lumping, and it is common to call a Markov chain lumpable w.r.t. a certain
state partition if the resulting lumped stochastic process is Markov [34]. We show below that
the full model is not strongly lumpable [34], [35] w.r.t. the proposed intermediate state partition.
Definition 1 ( [34]). A CTMC is called strongly lumpable w.r.t. a partition {Sk, k = 1, ..., K}
of its state space S if and only if the rate matrix Q of the CTMC satisfies that for each pair of
partitions Sk, Sk′ and for any pair of states i, j ∈ Sk,
∑
i′∈Sk′ qi,i′ =
∑
i′∈Sk′ qj,i′ .
Observation: The full-observability model CTMC is not strongly lumpable w.r.t. the state par-
tition induced by the intermediate model, as shown by considering a network with m = 3 compli-
ant stations. The full model state space is S = {φ, {1}, {2}, {3}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}}.
Consider two sets of states in the full model that map to state (1, 0) and (2, 1) in the intermediate
model: S1,0 = {{2}, {3}}, S2,1 = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}}. For i = {2},
∑
i′∈S2,1 qi,i′ = q{2},{1,2} +
q{2},{1,3} = λpI(1, {2}), while for state j = {3}, we have
∑
i′∈S2,1 qj,i′ = q{3},{1,2} + q{3},{1,3} =
λpI(1, {3}). By (1), pI(1, {2}) 6= pI(1, {3}) when station 1 has different distances to stations 2
and 3. Thus, the condition in Definition. 1 is violated, primarily due to the dependence of the
idle to active transition rates on the set of current active stations.
0, 0
1, 0
1, 1
2, 0
2, 1
3, 1
Fig. 6: CTMC of intermediate model (m = 3).
0, 0
1, 0
0, 1
1, 1
Fig. 7: CTMC of simplified model.
As the Markov chain under the full observability model is not strongly lumpable with respect to
the state partition induced by the intermediate model, the stochastic process for the intermediate
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model is not Markov. As our purpose is not to precisely model the aggregated stochastic process,
bu rather to detect the presence or absence of an RRJ, we approximate the intermediate model’s
stochastic process as a Markov process, and derive an optimal detector under this assumption.
We demonstrate the accuracy of this approximation in §IV.
In order to construct the intermediate model Markov chain, we must assign transition rates
qˆi,j for i, j ∈ Sˆ. For lumpable chains, the transition rates are obtained by directly summing
the transition rates from one aggregate set to another. As our chain is not lumpable, however,
we employ an alternate method, called ideal aggregate [36]. Under this method, the aggregated
transition rate for Yˆ , Yˆ ′ ∈ Sˆ under hypothesis Hb is:
qˆb
Yˆ ,Yˆ ′ =
∑
T ∈SYˆ P(Y = T |Hb)
∑
T ′∈SYˆ ′ q
b
T ,T ′∑
T ∈SYˆ P(Y = T |Hb)
=
∑
T ∈SYˆ pi
b
T
∑
T ′∈SYˆ ′ q
b
T ,T ′∑
T ∈SYˆ pi
b
T
, (23)
Here, Y denotes the (random) state under the full observability model. One advantage of using
the ideal aggregate is its preservation of the jamming efficiency, as shown in Proposition. 2.
Proposition 2. The full and the ideal aggregated CTMC have the same jamming efficiency η.
Proof: This follows immediately from the fact that the CTMC under ideal aggregation
preserves the aggregated stationary distribution of the full model for any state partition [37].
B. Simplified model: knowledge of whether or not there are active transmitters
In certain practical settings it will be unreasonable to assume that the AP is able to keep track
of the number of active transmitters, much less the identities of those transmitters. As such, this
section considers the “simplified” model, in which only two bits of information are available to
the AP: i) whether or not there are any active transmissions among the CS-compliant stations,
and ii) whether or not the SUT is active. The simplified model aggregates the station status
bits (Tk)mk=1 to two bits: S = maxk∈{2,...,m} Tk and X = T1. The interaction between the SUT
bit X and the CS bit S is captured as a four-state stochastic process Y˜ (t), where Y˜ = (S,X).
The simplification is equivalent to partitioning the state space S of the full-observability model
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into four aggregate sets, {S0,S1,S2,S3}, where i) S0 ≡ {∅} denotes no station is active; ii)
S1 ≡ {{1}} holds the state in which the SUT is the only active radio; iii) S2 ≡ {T ∈ S :
1 6∈ T , T 6= ∅} holds states in which the SUT is idle and at least one of the CS-compliant
stations is active; iv) S3 ≡ {T ∈ S : 1 ∈ T } holds states in which the SUT and at least one
CS-compliant station are active. The proposed state space aggregation aligns with our objective
to determine whether or not the SUT is CS-compliant or not. The state transition diagram for the
simplified model is shown in Fig. 7. Table II gives the transition rates of the Markov chain on
the simplified model state space under ideal aggregation (§III-A1), where p0(1, T ) = pI(1, T )
and p1(1, T ) = pA(1, T ), and the convenience parameters are defined in Table III.
q˜b00,10 q˜
b
10,00 q˜
b
00,01 q˜
b
01,00 q˜
b
01,11 q˜
b
11,01 q˜
b
10,11 q˜
b
11,10
(m− 1)λ βb10,00λ pb(1, φ)λ γ β01,11λ βb11,01λ βb10,11λ γ
TABLE II: Transition rates for the simplified model.
β01,11 β
b
10,00 β
b
10,11 β
b
11,01∑m
i=2 pI(i, {1})
∑
T ∈S2 pi
b
T 1{|T |=1}∑
T ∈S2 pi
b
T
∑
T ∈S2 pi
b
T p
b(1,T )∑
T ∈S2 pi
b
T
∑
T ∈S3 pi
b
T 1{|T |=2}∑
T ∈S3 pi
b
T
TABLE III: Convenience parameters in the transition rates for the simplified model.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We now present numerical results; network parameters are shown in Table 92. Fig. 8 shows
the network topology considered in the simulation: the topology spacing parameter R controls
the number of HT pairs in the network. Due to space limitations, we only show experimental
results of R = 40, which corresponds to stations 1-4 and stations 2-3 being HT pairs, when
Rayleigh fading is omitted.
A. Impacts of the RRJ parameters on the EER
This subsection shows how the RRJ parameters (pR, pJ) affect the detection EER. Fig. 10
shows the EER computed using the theoretical Var(Zb) in (11) (labeled “Gaussian”) and the EER
computed using the upper bound of Var(Zb) in Proposition. 1. We see the EER is not necessarily
2Parameter values are the defaults in ns-3 (https://www.nsnam.org/).
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Fig. 8: Wireless network topology.
pt 0.04 W
N0 4.0124 ∗ 10−13 W
θ 2.5119 ∗ 10−12 W
po 8.5959 ∗ 10−7 W
do 1 m
Fig. 9: Simulation parameters.
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(b) EER vs. pJ (pR = 0.1)
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(c) EER vs. pJ (pR = 1)
Fig. 10: Relationship between jamming parameters and the EER (m = 6, W = 1000).
a monotone function of either pR or pJ . We also observe the upper bound is somewhat loose
when pR is small (with pJ fixed) and when pJ is large (with pR fixed). This looseness provides
justification for our development of the LDP in the objective function of Theorem. 1.
B. RRJ strategies under the full observability model
As proposed in §II-C3, the jamming efficiency constraint may be approximated via Taylor
series pi1 to approximately compute the jamming efficiency η(prrj). Denote the approximated
efficiency obtained using pi1ts(prrj, k) as ηts(prrj, k). We first investigates the difference between
η and ηts(prrj, 1), ηts(prrj, 2) respectively. As shown in Fig. 11a (plotted on the pR-pJ plane
with grid interval 0.0244), the difference between the first-order and second-order Taylor series
truncation is not very large, and the average relative difference |ηts(prrj,1)−η(prrj)|
η(prrj)
is 0.0883, and the
average relative error |ηts(prrj,2)−η(prrj)|
η(prrj)
is 0.0828. Fig. 11b shows the absolute relative difference
between ηts(prrj, 1) and η(prrj), and we can see that the discrepancy is small when pR and pJ
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Fig. 11: Compare ηts(prrj, 1), ηts(prrj, 2) with the true η
(pˆrrj = [0.5, 0.5], m = 6, R = 40)
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Fig. 12: Optimal choices of pR
and pJ vs. τη (m = 6, R = 40).
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Fig. 13: EER vs. pR − pJ
(m = 6, W = 1000).
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Fig. 14: PDFs of Z0, Z1 (su-
pervised, pR = 0.01, pJ = 1).
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Fig. 15: PDFs of Z0, Z1 (semi-
supervised, pR=0.01, pJ = 1).
are large. Fig. 12 presents the optimal pR and pJ obtained by solving the optimization problem
(20), and shows that the optimal solution is always obtained at pR = 1 and the choice of pJ
depends on the jamming efficiency threshold. However, the efficiency constraint in (20) uses
pi1ts(prrj, 1) which overestimates η, especially when pR and pJ are small by Fig. 11a. Therefore,
the optimization yields solutions that have a slightly lower jamming efficiency than τη.
C. Comparison the supervised and the semi-supervised models
This experiment compares the detection performance of the supervised detector proposed in
§II-B and the semi-supervised detector proposed in §II-D. We can see from Fig. 13 that the semi-
supervised anomaly detector has a much higher EER than the supervised detector. Comparison
between Fig. 14 and Fig. 15 shows the performance degradation is due to the fact that the
semi-supervised test statistics have a much larger variance than the supervised ones.
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Fig. 18: ROC and location graph
when all three models have similar
detection accuracy (prrj = [0.8, 0.2]).
Fig. 19: ROC and location graph for two example cases
that the simplified model has significantly higher EER
than the intermediate and full model (prrj = [0.8, 0.2]).
D. Comparison between the full and limited observability models
This section compares the supervised hypothesis testing of the full observability and the two
limited observability models. In the simulation, we generate n = 104 compliant sample paths
y0W (correspond to the DTMC with P
0) and n RRJ sample paths y1W (correspond to the DTMC
with P1). For each sample path with length W , we can compute the transition counts Ni,j of the
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full model, and also we can compute the aggregated transition counts Nˆi,j of the intermediate
model, and N˜i,j of the simplified model. With the transition counts, we can compute the test
statistic Z of each sample path and perform the supervised hypothesis testing to determine if
a sample path is generated from the compliant DTMC or the RRJ DTMC. Fig. 16 shows the
Pareto efficient allocations of the full, intermediate and simplified models with the topology in
Fig. 8. The Pareto efficiency is defined from the point of view of RRJ, i.e., a RRJ will prefer
large EER and large η. Fig. 16 demonstrates that the simplified model is advantageous for RRJ
in that it has a higher EER and η. This is due to the fact that the amount of information available
to the jamming detector is significantly reduced in the four-state simplified model than the other
two models with state space size 2m and 2m. Fig. 17 shows the distance of each operating point
(pR, pJ) to the Pareto frontier of the full model, and we can see the distance is small with large
pR, which demonstrates the Pareto efficient operating points have pR value close to 1.
To investigate if the large EER gain of the simplified model over the other two models are
consistent for various network topologies, we randomize the station location by randomly placing
the stations in a 70× 70 area, and plot the corresponding ROC of the three models as shown in
Fig. 18 and Fig. 19. We can see from Fig. 18 the full, intermediate, and simplified models all
obtain similar detection accuracy. However, Fig. 19 shows two cases that the simplified model
has a much larger detection error than the other two models. The difference among the three
models’ detection accuracy highly depends upon the geographical distributions of stations.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper analyzed the RJ detection problem in the presence of HTs in networks by measuring
(non)compliance with CS. Formulating this jamming detection problem as a generic Markov
chain hypothesis testing problem, we derived an upper bound on the variance of the test statistic,
and developed a novel optimization problem for an intelligent RRJ to determine its optimal
operating point at which the desired tradeoff between the jamming efficiency and the risk of
exposure is achieved. We introduced three models: the full observability model, the intermediate
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model, and the simplified model, corresponding to increasingly realistic assumptions regarding
the network state information available at the AP.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA. 1
Proof: For an ergodic CTMC having transition matrix with simple eigenvalues, its transition
matrix can be written as: Pb ∈ R(d+1)×(d+1) = UΛbV where V = [v0, ...,vd]T = U−1 is the
left eigenvector matrix of Pb, and U = [u0, ...,ud] is the right eigenvector matrix of Pb, and
Λ = diag{λb0, ..., λbd} holds the eigenvalues of the matrix sorted according to |1 − λb0| ≤ ... ≤
|1− λbd|. Since λb0 is 1 with left eigenvector pib and right eigenvector 1, thus we can write
[Pb
(t′)
]i,j =
[
d∑
r=0
λbr
(t′)
urv
ᵀ
r
]
i,j
= pibj +
d∑
r=1
λbr
(t′)
uirvrj, (24)
where λbr
(t′) denotes the t′-th power of λbr . First, we want to derive the upper bound of Var[Ni,j]
in (9). According to (24), we have
W∑
t′=1
(W − t′)bj,i(t
′−1)
=
W∑
t′=1
(W − t′)
d∑
r=1
λbr
(t′−1)
ujrvri =
d∑
r=1
ujrvri
W∑
t′=1
(W − t′)λbr (t
′−1)
=
d∑
r=1
ujrvri
λbr
(W ) −Wλbr + (W − 1)
(1− λbr)2
=
d∑
r=1
ujrvri
(
λbr
(W ) − 1
(1− λbr)2
+
W
1− λbr
)
(a)
≤
d∑
r=1
|ujrvri|
(
2
|1− λbr |2
+
W
|1− λbr |
)
(b)
≤
d∑
r=1
|ujrvri|
(
2
|1− λb1|2
+
W
|1− λb1|
)
≤ cj,i2 +W |1− λ
b
1|
|1− λb1|2
(25)
where (a) follows by the triangle inequality of complex numbers and |λbr | ≤ 1 for r ≥ 1, (b)
follows by |1 − λ1| ≤ |1 − λbr | for r ≥ 2, cj,i ≡
∑d
r=1 |ujrvri| is a constant depends on the
eigenvectors of Pb. According to (9), and (25), we can then derive (12). Similarly,
−Wpibi + 2
W−1∑
t′=1
(W − t′)
(
bj,i
(t′−1)
+ bj′,i
(t′−1)) ≤ −Wpibi + (cj,i + cj′,i)(2 +W |1− λb1|)|1− λb1|2 (26)
The upper-bound of Cov[
Nbi,j
W
,
Nb
i,j′
W
] follows immediately by substituting (26) into (10).
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA. 3
Proof: Define the transition probability vector of full model from state i to states in S as:
p0i ∈ R1×(d+1), p1i ∈ R1×(d+1).
I(P0,P1(prrj)) =
∑
i
pi0i
∑
j
p0i,j ln
p0i,j
p1i,j
(a)
=
∑
i∗∈S¬1
pi0i∗D(p
0
i∗||p1i∗), (27)
where S¬1 ≡ {T ∈ S : 1 /∈ T } denotes the set of the indices of all states that do not contain
the SUT, D(p||q) denotes the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence between p and q; (a) is due to
the fact that D(p||q) is non-zero when p 6= q, and the transition probabilities pi∗0 and pi∗1 are
not equal only when i∗ ∈ S¬1 according to the definition of RRJ’s Markov chain in §II-A2. It is
known that the KL divergence D(p||q) is a convex function in q [38]. Since in our case, p1i∗ is an
affine function of the jamming parameters of the RRJ p1i∗ = A[pR, pJ ]
ᵀ+b, where A is a matrix
with its hj∗-th row (hj∗ is the index of state j∗ = T ∪ {1}) being: [λupI(1, T ), λu(1− pI(1, T ))],
and all the other elements are zeros, and b is an array with each element bj being: bj = p0i∗,j
if j 6= j∗; bj = 0 if j = j∗. Since affine mapping preserves the convexity of the function [39],
D(pi∗
0||p1i∗) is a convex function of [pR, pJ ]. Therefore, as a non-negative weighted sum of
convex functions of [pR, pJ ] as in (27), I(P0,P1(prrj)) is also a convex function of [pR, pJ ].
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